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The
The effect of human behavior
on the law
By Jim Gibson
icture a speed limit that starts at 55 miles per hou1; but then
varies based on the speed of the cars that pass by. If the average
speed is 60, the speed limit slowly adjusts toward 60. If the
average speed is 50, the speed limit eventually becomes 50.
This is an example of how real-world behavior might feed back
into the law and help form a legal standard. Of course, speed limits
don't really work this way (although enforcement of speed limits is
another question). Yet this kind of "feedback loop" exists in a great
many areas of the law. The law frequently derives its content from the

Employers must make "reasonable accommodations" for their
disabled employees. The list is endless.

Yet within this familiar concept lurks a phenomenon that can
lead the law astray. Consider again tort's "reasonable care"
standard. Suppose a doctor is examining a swollen lymph node.
After conducting a physical exam and taking X-rays, she is
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nearly certain that the node is merely infected and that
the patient should simply take some antibiotics.
But the doctor is concerned about malpractice
liability and the inherent uncertainty of the tort system.
She knows that there is a chance, however small, that the

swelling is cancerous-and if it is, a jury might find her
liable for a faulty diagnosis even though she rightfully
believes that she is exercising reasonable care and that she

has done everything that her peers would do. She therefore over complies. She does more than the law demands.
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She orders an ultrasound, despite reliable medical evidence that the procedure is unnecessary and wasteful.
As an isolated incident, this overcompliance would
not be particularly troubling. But if 1nost doctors react
the same way to the specter of liability, wasteful practice
will beco~e common_ practice. And once it does, it will
eventually cease to constitute more-than-reasonable care,
because reasonable care draws its definition from the
typical conduct of ,those it regulates. The ultrasow1d's
ubiquity will atcordip.gly make it part of the reasonable
care standard, and doctors w4o fail to order an ultrasound will be judged negligent. In this way, overcautious
practices feed back into doctrine, making negligence law
more demanding and requiring doctors to use a medically unnecessary and wasteful diagnostic tool.
This feedback loop can then repeat itself Now that
the ultrasoWld represents mere compliance, rather than
overcompliance, it no longer represents more care than
the law demands. So the next time our overcautious
doctor wants to give liability a wide berth, she may order
not only an ultrasoWld, but a biopsy as well. And if
her fellow doctors do the same, reasonable care ratchets
upward once again, incorporating the use of a biopsy into
the negligence standard. It's as if we have a self-adjusting
speed limit, and no matter what it's set at, eve1yone
exceeds it-so it keeps going up, and up, and up.
Unfortunately, this is not mere theory. There is
considerable evidence that malpractice pressures force
doctors to practice "defensive medicine"-order more
procedw·es, perform more tests, make more referrals,
and so forth. This over-compliance eventually works its
way back into the malpractice standard.
\
Nor is evidence of the feedback effect
·\
limited to medical malpractice. The feedback
loop in other areas of tort law may be
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harder to see, but inconspicuous
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does not mean immate-

ingly fatuous warnings displayed on consumer goods, as
manufacturers seek to avoid products liability by staying
one step more conservative than the norm. Why else
would one see this label on a box of nails: "CAUTION!
Do NOT swallow nails! May cause irritation!" (I wish I
were malcing that up.)
We may also find feedback loops outside of tort
law. Perhaps "reasonable accommodations" for disabled
employees become progressively more accommodating,
as risk-averse employers give federal disability law a
wide berth. Or consider "reasonable expectations of privacy," the touchstone for determining whether a search
is constitutional. Police operating in the shadow of this
vague standard may consistently undercomply-that
is, conduct illegal searches-knowing that the upside is
great (the discovery of incriminatory evidence) and the
downside unlikely (the exclusion of that evidence). If
so, then the public might eventually grow accustomed
to such intrusions, which means that our reasonable
expectations of privacy would diminish, and our constitutional rights would dutifully follow. Law enforcement
would then have even more license to intrude on our
privacy, and the cycle would begin anew.
So what might we do about these feedback loops?
It would be impossible to get rid of all those legal standards that derive from real-world practice. Nor would
we want to, even ifwe could. When the law incorporates
what people actually do, it grounds itself in the friendly
and familiar territory of shared experience, of conventional wisdom, of consensus. It's inherently democratic.
Running away from reasonableness is no answer.
In the end, the best we can hope for is that policymalcers temper their reliance on real-world practice
when there's reason to believe that it departs from
optimal behavior. In medical inalpractice, for example,
courts should malce more use of evidence from
practice in a given field. Reference to real-world
practice inay seem both sensible and defensible,
but the real world is never as simple as theory
would lead us to believe. We must recognize
instead that the ve1y doctrines that derive
from practice can also distort it. II
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